America’s Unforgiving Forgiveness Program: Problems and Solutions for Public Service Loan Forgiveness by Wu, Robert
Hastings Law Journal 
Volume 72 Issue 3 Article 6 
3-2021 
America’s Unforgiving Forgiveness Program: Problems and 
Solutions for Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
Robert Wu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Wu, America’s Unforgiving Forgiveness Program: Problems and Solutions for Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 959 (2021). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol72/iss3/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
 
[959] 
America’s Unforgiving Forgiveness Program: 
Problems and Solutions for Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness 
ROBERT WU† 
In the first three years of Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), over 227,000 borrowers 
applied for relief. The U.S. Department of Education granted relief to less than 3800 borrowers, 
denying forgiveness to roughly 98% of the program’s applicants. This astronomically high 
rejection rate raises questions of responsibility for the program’s initial failure. Many have 
blamed the Trump Administration for using its political influence to manufacture an unforgiving 
result. However, a purely political explanation for the program’s failure provides an incomplete 
illustration of the reasons underlying PSLF’s demise.  
This Note examines the numerous pitfalls that resulted in PSLF’s unforgiving forgiveness rate. 
Specifically, it reviews the program’s development, from its creation in the halls of Congress, to 
various refinements developed under the Obama Administration, and the Trump 
Administration’s management of the program. Through this analysis, this Note raises two core 
issues underlying PSLF. First, the program contains a statutory and regulatory framework that 
appears oblivious to the realities of federal student loan repayment. Combining this disastrous 
framework with the second issue, the Trump Administration’s apathetic execution of the 
program, created a scenario that doomed borrowers seeking forgiveness.  
Ultimately, this Note recommends that Congress and the Department of Education develop 
comprehensive, multi-pronged reforms to address the program’s numerous problems. PSLF is 
more than just a borrower-friendly program; it provides vital recruitment incentives for public 
service employers who serve as the backbone of the nation’s communities. These reforms, if 
implemented, would create a robust and accommodating program that would successfully 
deliver loan forgiveness to our nation’s dedicated public servants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  There are many different provisions in the legislation, and we will come 
to grips with those as the morning goes on, but this is saying to the young 
people: If you finish up in school and college and you have debt and you 
want to become a schoolteacher, you want to work in the criminal justice 
system, you want to work with special needs children, you want to work for 
a nonprofit, you will never pay more than 15 percent of your income in 
repayment of your debt. And after a period of years, a 10-year period of 
time, your debt will be forgiven in full–completely. . . . This is an incentive 
for young people to be able to go into public service and serve their 
community. I think it is enormously important and responsive to the 
time. . . . [T]his is a matter of enormous importance. It is a matter of 
enormous consequence.1 
On September 7, 2007, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act 
(CCRAA) cleared its final legislative hurdle in the U.S. Congress. In the 
morning, during seventy-two minutes of debate, senators highlighted the 
crucial student loan relief that the bill offered to public servants.2 Shortly 
thereafter, the reconciled bill passed the Senate on a 79–12 margin.3 That 
afternoon, the bill sailed through the House of Representatives on a 292–97 
vote.4 Twenty days later, President Bush signed the CCRAA into law,5 
creating Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF). 
At first glance, the requirements of PSLF appear simple. Under the 
program, the U.S. Department of Education (USED) forgives the student loan 
balance of a borrower who makes 120 income-driven, on-time monthly 
payments on a federal Direct Loan while working for a qualifying public 
service employer.6 Simplified, a borrower who holds a qualifying loan receives 
complete, tax-exempt student loan forgiveness after ten years of public service 
and loan payments. 
PSLF appealed to and attracted many borrowers. Between October 2017 
and November 2020,7 227,382 unique borrowers applied for forgiveness.8 Yet 
 
 1. 153 CONG. REC. S11,242 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
 2. Seven senators mentioned “public service” in their CCRAA floor speeches. Id. at S11,241–56 
(statements of Sens. Ted Kennedy, Sherrod Brown, Patty Murray, Barbara Boxer, Chris Dodd, Russ Feingold, 
and Jeff Bingaman). Senator Clinton also mentioned “public service” but did not speak during the debate; she 
was campaigning for the 2008 Democratic presidential primary and later inserted her comments into the 
Congressional record. Id. at S11,249 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton). 
 3. Id. at S11,256. 
 4. 153 CONG. REC. H10307–08 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007). 
 5. Press Release, White House, President Bush Signs H.R. 2669 and H.R. 3580 into Law (Sept. 27, 
2007), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070927-5.html. 
 6. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m). 
 7. This time period reflects the time between when the USED began accepting PSLF applications, and 
the latest dataset available at the time of publication. 
 8. See rows 8 and 16 of the November 2020 PSLF Data Report. Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, 
FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data (last visited Feb. 25, 
2021) [hereinafter November 2020 PSLF Data Report] (click “November 2020 Report” hyperlink to 
download). 
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the USED denied relief to 223,606 of those applicants—a rejection rate of over 
98%.9 In other words, just 1.66% of applicants received relief.10 That statistic 
is the epitome of a failed policy. 
 
Table 1: PSLF Application Processing Data (as of November 2020)11 
Unique Borrowers Submitting PSLF 
Applications 
227,382 
Unique Borrowers with PSLF 
Discharges Processed 
3776 (~1.66% of borrowers) 
Unique Borrowers Currently Denied 
Relief 
223,606 (~98.34% of borrowers)  
 
PSLF delivered significant student debt relief to successful applicants. As 
of November 2020, the USED has collectively discharged over $290 million in 
debt,12 an average relief of $76,906 per borrower.13 The existence of successful 
applicants could lead one to argue that the program is operating as it should.14 
Yet a rejection rate that, after three years of processing, hovers around 98% 
signals that borrower carelessness is likely not the underlying issue to PSLF’s 
problems. Indeed, the search for alternative explanations has led to political 
finger-pointing, characterized in an April 2019 New York Times article: 
In a budget hearing last month, Senator Jeff Merkley, Democrat of Oregon, 
grilled Betsy DeVos, the [S]ecretary of [E]ducation, over the sorry state of 
the Public Service Loan Forgiveness program . . . . Ms. DeVos said Congress 
had made it difficult to qualify, while Mr. Merkley insisted that the 
Education Department wasn’t holding servicers accountable for poor 
customer service.15  
In truth, both Senator Merkley and then-Secretary DeVos correctly noted 
issues within PSLF. The program’s numerous problems include faulty statutes 
and regulations, shifting interpretations of qualifying standards, and inadequate 
 
 9. In the November 2020 PSLF Data Report, id., subtract borrowers who received forgiveness (row 16) 
from the total number of borrowers (row 8). That amounts to 223,606 denied borrowers; divide that by the 
total number of borrowers (row 8) to calculate a rejection rate of roughly 98.34% (or an acceptance rate of 
1.66%). See id. 
 10. See discussion and arithmetic supra notes 8–9. 
 11. November 2020 PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (calculating data from rows 8, 11, 12, 13, and 16).  
 12. See id. (row 15). 
 13. See id. (row 17). 
 14. For example, former U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, while testifying before the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies, stated, 
“The rules that [Congress] set up, the legislation [Congress] passed, make [receiving PSLF relief] difficult. So 
within that context, we are forgiving as many student loans [sic] under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
program as are qualified for.” Education Department Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request (CSPAN television 
broadcast Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?459264-1/senators-press-education-secretary-devos-
proposed-budget-cuts (quote begins at 1:33:05). 
 15. Ron Lieber, Your Student Loan Servicer Will Call You Back in a Year. Sorry., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/12/your-money/public-service-loan-forgiveness.html. 
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oversight over loan servicers. Yet many have isolated the program’s core issue 
as one of political interference, accusing the Trump Administration of 
“deliberate sabotage” to PSLF.16 
Certainly, the Trump Administration cannot absolve itself of blame for 
the program’s failure. President Trump’s USED repeatedly threatened17 to 
eliminate PSLF and slowed the program’s effectiveness by adopting narrow 
interpretations of qualifying public service18 and obstructing oversight over 
student loan servicers.19 However, solely blaming the Trump Administration is 
an incomplete diagnosis of the program’s problems. 
This Note argues that PSLF’s current problems stem from the program’s 
dysfunctional origin: a poorly designed statutory and regulatory framework 
that was incompatible with the capabilities of America’s student loan system. 
Congress and the USED mandated loans that, at the time, were uncommon and 
unpopular among borrowers.20 As a result, current PSLF applicants, who 
started their paths toward forgiveness a decade ago, began their qualification at 
a time when the nation’s student loan infrastructure was a poor fit for the 
program’s requirements. 
This issue made the program a ticking time bomb for any USED that 
inherited it. PSLF’s statute and implementing regulations are written in rigid 
terms,21 preventing a potentially sympathetic USED official from leniently 
applying rules and granting forgiveness to more borrowers. Instead, the statute 
enforces prerequisites that current applicants are unlikely to meet. PSLF’s high 
rejection rates are the result of a catastrophic combination between the 
program’s faulty framework and the Trump Administration’s exacerbating 
actions. 
 
 16. Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, AFT President Randi Weingarten Slams Education 
Department for Deliberate Sabotage of Public Service Loan Forgiveness (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.aft.org/press-release/aft-president-randi-weingarten-slams-education-department-deliberate. 
 17. In every budget proposed under the Trump Administration, the USED has sought to eliminate the 
PSLF program. See Tom Anderson, Trump’s Budget Seeks to Eliminate One Major Benefit of Federal Student 
Loans That Costs Billions, CNBC (May 24, 2017, 7:39 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/24/trumps-
budget-seeks-to-cut-one-major-benefit-of-federal-student-loans.html; Annie Nova, Trump’s Budget Would 
End Student Loan Forgiveness Program, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2018, 5:54 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/12/trumps-budget-would-end-student-loan-forgiveness-program.html; Annie 
Nova, Education Dept. Faces 10% Funding Cut Under Trump’s 2020 Budget Proposal, CNBC (Mar. 12, 
2019, 1:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/11/trumps-budget-proposal-would-cancel-public-service-
loan-forgiveness.html; Annie Nova, Trump Looks to Kill Student Loan Forgiveness Program, CNBC (Feb. 11, 
2020, 10:46 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/10/trump-proposes-end-to-student-loan-forgiveness-
program.html. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 21. For example, PSLF’s statute specifies that only payments made on Direct Loans will qualify for the 
program, disqualifying payments made on other types of loans (such as Perkins Loans or Federal Family 
Education Loans). 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A). For a discussion of the consequences of these rigid 
requirements in the PSLF context, see infra Part II.A. 
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Once all of PSLF’s problems are identified, what should be done to fix it? 
The political realm abounds with suggestions. Republicans have sought to axe 
the program in its entirety.22 Democrats have recommended broadening the 
program’s requirements to allow more borrowers to qualify for forgiveness.23 
Some scholars have suggested that no action is necessary, hypothesizing that 
Obama-era reforms24 will allow the program to correct itself.25 The spectrum 
of proposed solutions highlights the political interests and administrative issues 
rooted within PSLF and illustrates the need for a comprehensive solution. 
To address PSLF’s immediate problems, Congress and the USED should 
implement a multi-pronged policy that eases the program’s rigid requirements 
and diminishes the control that loan servicers possess. First, Congress should 
pass legislation allowing all federal loans and repayment plans to qualify for 
forgiveness. Doing so would broaden the program’s scope, as it currently 
limits relief to individuals who hold a particular type of federal loan and 
payment plan.26 
While Congress reforms the program’s requirements, the USED should 
promulgate two rulemakings. First, it should develop precise definitions and 
categories for qualifying “public service” positions. Clear definitions would 
reduce uncertainty among borrowers, who currently face shifting 
interpretations over which positions qualify for forgiveness. Second, the USED 
should design regulations which (1) mandate loan servicer oversight, (2) 
increase the number of servicers which manage PSLF loans, and (3) allow 
borrowers to change servicers. Implementing these rulemakings would 
decrease the monopoly that each servicer currently holds over its borrowers 
and create economic incentives to encourage servicers to provide optimal 
customer service.  
These changes would allow PSLF’s benefits to flow to a greater number 
of student borrowers, creating an impetus for further reform. A wave of 
program successes would catalyze the need for more innovative changes, such 
as a web-based platform for collecting payments and tracking progress toward 
forgiveness. PSLF successes would also incentivize other entities, including 
higher education institutions, to promote27 the program to students. These 
 
 22. See discussion supra note 17. 
 23. Annie Nova, Bill May Help Millions Qualify for Popular Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, 
CNBC (Apr. 11, 2019, 5:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/11/bill-may-help-millions-qualify-for-
popular-public-service-loan-forgiveness-program.html. 
 24. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 25. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Why Are 99% of the Applications for Debt Discharge Under the Public 
Service Loan Forgiveness Program Being Denied, and Will This Change? 31 (June 17, 2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3397656 (“[A]pproval rates . . . will surely rise significantly over time, 
if only because each year an increasingly large proportion of outstanding federal student loans . . . are the 
Direct Loans which are eligible for forgiveness . . . and because each year a rapidly increasing proportion of 
borrowers enroll in eligible income-based loan repayment programs . . . .”); see also Hornsby, infra note 180. 
 26. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A). 
 27. PSLF, generally, suffers from a dearth of promotion to students. See Allesandra Lanza, How You Can 
Requalify for Public Service Loan Forgiveness, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2018, 10:00 AM), 
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advancements, if executed properly, would sharpen PSLF to serve as a 
powerful loan forgiveness program that benefits student borrowers, public 
service employers, and communities across the nation.  
This Note explains why Public Service Loan Forgiveness has denied 
relief to over 98% of applicants and illustrates how particular reforms can 
address the program’s shortcomings. Part I lays the groundwork with an 
overview of the program’s origin and development. Part II discusses the major 
problems, embedded in PSLF’s originating framework and the Trump 
Administration’s management, that have contributed to the program’s high 
rejection rate. Part III examines why action is needed to fix PSLF’s problems 
and explains the program’s importance for borrowers and public service 
employers. Part IV concludes by providing a policy blueprint to refine PSLF 
into a comprehensive initiative that delivers its promise of student loan 
forgiveness for public servants. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS 
PSLF has had a short, yet turbulent, history. After its creation, the 
program experienced both impactful reform and undermining interference 
during the following two presidential administrations.28 Understanding the 
nuances of PSLF’s development, detailed below, is critical to identifying the 
program’s problems and areas for reform. 
A. BIPARTISAN BEGINNINGS, PARTISAN PRODUCT 
In January 2007, congressional Republicans, fresh off “a thumping”29 in 
the midterm elections, returned to Capitol Hill as the minority party in both the 
House and Senate.30 Their Democratic counterparts planned an ambitious 
agenda to counter President George W. Bush’s priorities.31 However, a harsh 
reality quickly chilled this ambition: Democrats lacked the necessary votes to 
override President Bush’s vetoes.32 If congressional Democrats wanted to 
achieve their ambitious vision, they had to work with Republicans in a 
bipartisan manner. 
This predicament extended to addressing the nation’s escalating student 




 28. See discussion infra Part I.B, I.C. 
 29. The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2052, 2058 (Nov. 8, 2006). 
 30. John M. Broder, Democrats Gain Senate and New Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/10/us/politics/10elect.html. 
 31. Carl Hulse, Democrats Plan First 100 Hours, Give or Take a Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/03/washington/03cong.html. 
 32. Charles Babington, Bush Wields Vetoes to Block Democrats, WASH. POST. (Sept. 24, 2007, 11:09 
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092400108.html. 
 33. See COLL. BD., TRENDS IN HIGHER EDUCATION SERIES: TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 7 figs.3 & 4 
(2006), https://research.collegeboard.org/pdf/trends-college-pricing-2006-full-report.pdf. 
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students to turn to both federal and private loans to afford a higher education.34 
The concept of students taking out private loans alarmed Americans, as the 
private lending industry epitomized significant debt and few borrower 
safeguards.35 This crisis, if left unchecked by government action, threatened to 
submerge students into alarming amounts of debt just to obtain a college 
degree. 
Amid mounting public concern, the House Committee on Education and 
Labor (HCEL) and Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions (HELP) sprung to action. Working in a bipartisan manner, the 
(Democrat) Chairpersons and (Republican) Ranking Members of HCEL 
(Representatives George Miller and Buck McKeon, respectively)36 and HELP 
(Senators Ted Kennedy and Mike Enzi, respectively)37 spearheaded proposals 
in their respective chambers. In July 2007, the House38 and Senate39 passed 
their respective versions of the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 
2007 (CCRAA). Shortly thereafter, the House and Senate convened a 
conference committee to resolve differences between the two versions.40 
In addition to the challenges of reconciliation, the CCRAA faced 
opposition from the President. Before the House’s vote, President Bush 
released a Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) threatening to veto the 
bill because it failed “to target aid to the neediest students” and created “new 
mandatory Federal programs and policies that are poorly designed and would 
have significant long-term costs to the taxpayer.”41 In a later SAP, Bush also 
signaled a veto of the Senate’s version of the CCRAA, but indicated his desire 
to work “with Congress to resolve these issues through the legislative 
process.”42 This last statement set the stage for compromise and bipartisanship. 
Instead, Miller and Kennedy led congressional Democrats in the opposite 
direction. Over the next month, Democrats ironed out differences with 
“virtually no input” from Republicans.43 In September 2007, Democratic 
 
 34. See Donald E. Heller, The Impact of Student Loans on College Access, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
STUDENT AID POLICIES: WHAT THE RESEARCH TELLS US 39, 41 fig.1 (Sandy Baum, Michael McPherson & 
Patricia Steele eds., 2008). 
 35. Diana Jean Schemo, Student Loans Deepen a Crisis in Student Debt, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/us/10loans.html. 
 36. 153 CONG. REC. H39 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2007). 
 37. 153 CONG. REC. S501–02 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2007). 
 38. 153 CONG. REC. H7558 (daily ed. July 11, 2007). 
 39. 153 CONG. REC. S9661 (daily ed. July 20, 2007). 
 40. Amit R. Paley, Senate Approves Overhaul of Student Loan Program, WASH. POST. (July 20, 2007), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071902389.html. 
 41. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: 
H.R. 2669—COLLEGE COST REDUCTION ACT OF 2007 (2007), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr2669sap-r.pdf. 
 42. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: 
S. 1762—HIGHER EDUCATION ACCESS OF 2007 (2007), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/ 
legislative/sap/110-1/s1762sap-s.pdf. 
 43. Doug Lederman, Democrats Set Education Budget Compromise, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 6, 
2007), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/06/democrats-set-education-budget-compromise. 
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congressional leaders agreed on a reconciled CCRAA that effectively split the 
difference between the House and Senate versions.44 The compromise 
increased the maximum Pell Grant amount, slashed subsidies to lenders, and 
directed those savings toward programs designed to increase the accessibility 
of higher education.45 
Though it lacked bipartisan input, the reconciled CCRAA received 
lukewarm approval from some GOP leaders. Education Secretary Margaret 
Spellings recommended that President Bush sign the bill because it answered 
his “call to significantly increase” Pell Grant funding.46 While other 
Republicans derided the CCRAA as a “form of socialism” that would “cripple 
the private sector loan” industry, 47 the reconciled bill sailed comfortably 
through Congress, clearing both chambers on September 7, 2007.48 Twenty 
days later, President Bush signed the CCRAA into law, noting that the 
legislation “takes important steps to put higher education within reach for more 
of the men and women who wear our Nation’s uniform.”49 
Section 401 of the CCRAA, titled “Loan Forgiveness for Public Service 
Employees”, created PSLF. The section amended Title 20, Section 1087e of 
the United States Code to require the Education Secretary to: 
cancel the balance . . . on any eligible Federal Direct Loan not in default for 
a borrower who . . . (A) has made 120 monthly payments on the eligible 
Federal Direct Loan after October 1, 2007 . . . pursuant to . . . (i) payments 
under an income-based repayment plan . . . (B)(i) is employed in a public 
service job at the time of such forgiveness; and (ii) has been employed in a 
public service job during the period in which the borrower makes each of the 
120 payments . . . .50 
PSLF was designed to increase the appeal of public service by offering 
financial stability for an expensive prerequisite: higher education. 
Concurrently, the program would incentivize graduates to seek positions with 
public sector employers, which paid relatively less than private sector 
counterparts and thus faced employment shortages.51  
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Diana Jean Schemo, Congress Approves Student Loan Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/education/07cnd-loans.html. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 49. Remarks on Signing the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1244, 1244 (Sept. 
27, 2007). 
 50. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 800 
(2007). 
 51. In his concluding remarks on the CCRAA, Senator Kennedy stated: 
[I]t is the desire of so many of these young people to be involved in public service and to help respond to the 
needs in their communities. . . . So often, because of their indebtedness, they have to choose careers in order to 
deal with the indebtedness. . . . We are giving them a pathway to making a difference in terms of the future of 
our country . . . . 
153 CONG. REC. S11,254, S11,258 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). 
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After the CCRAA received President Bush’s signature, the USED 
initiated the rulemaking process. On July 1, 2008, the USED issued a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking seeking comments on PSLF’s implementation.52 
Commenters “overwhelmingly supported the program,” believing it would “be 
an important tool for attracting graduates and retaining talented employees in 
critical jobs that support our society’s well-being.”53 The USED’s final 
regulations generally mirrored the requirements under section 401 of the 
CCRAA. To receive tax-exempt forgiveness on their remaining loan balance, a 
borrower must (1) be employed full-time by a qualifying public service 
employer, (2) have a federal Direct Loan that is paid using income-driven54 
repayments, (3) make 120 on-time monthly payments on that Direct Loan 
while working for a public service employer, and (4) submit a form to the 
USED attesting to meet these requirements.55 
While these key requirements flowed directly from statutory language, 
the retroactive application aspect of PSLF’s administration comes from the 
USED’s rulemaking. Section 685.219(e) of the program’s implementing 
regulations allows a borrower to request loan forgiveness only “[a]fter making 
the 120 monthly qualifying payments on the eligible loans for which loan 
forgiveness is requested.”56 This regulation places significant risk on a 
borrower: instead of first registering for the program and having initial 
qualifications checked, she must accrue ten years of service and payments and 
then apply for forgiveness, hoping that all her actions fulfilled the program’s 
requirements.57 As discussed later, this retroactive framework has created 
major problems for current PSLF applicants. 
Overall, the USED’s rulemaking was implemented with little fanfare, 
perhaps because PSLF’s benefits would not be realized for about a decade. 
However, that temporal limitation did not prevent President Barack Obama, 
 
 52. Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 37,694, 37,704–09 (July 1, 2008) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 
674, 682, 685). 
 53. Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 63,232, 62,343 (Oct. 23, 2008) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 
674, 682, 685). 
 54. While both the CCRAA’s text and PSLF’s finalized regulations contain a provision that allows a 
“standard repayment plan” to qualify for forgiveness, its internal references specify that forgiveness under this 
provision is limited to standard repayment plans that have ten-year terms. Such a provision is functionally 
useless for the purposes of attaining PSLF relief, as a borrower would have completely paid off their debt 
during the ten-year term and thus would need no forgiveness. See internal statutory references within 20 
U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A)(ii) (CCRAA’s text) and 34 C.F.R. § 685.219(c)(1)(iv)(C) (the USED’s implementing 
regulations). 
 55. Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2008). 
 56. Id. § 685.219(e)(1). 
 57. Ideally, a borrower is incredibly prudent and checks their program qualifications before committing 
to PSLF-related employment. However, most federal loans are managed by a servicer, which may mislead 
borrowers. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
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who followed President Bush in the White House, from implementing 
significant changes to improve the program’s accessibility. 
B. REFINEMENT: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION IMPROVES PROGRAM 
ACCESS  
President Obama’s inauguration, in January 2009, shuffled student debt 
improvements to the top of the West Wing’s policy agenda. Even though PSLF 
relief would not be distributed during its tenure,58 the Obama Administration 
worked to make the program more accessible to borrowers and mitigate 
potential problems.  
The first of these improvements came in 2010, when the USED 
announced its discontinuation of the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) 
Program. FFELs are student loans funded by private lenders;59 the federal 
government guaranteed these loans and fixed their interest rates.60 President 
Obama characterized FFELs as taxpayers “paying banks a premium to act as 
middlemen, a premium that costs the American people billions of dollars each 
year.”61 Despite opposition from congressional Republicans,62 the 
administration attached the FFEL Program’s defunding as a rider bill to the 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act.63 Beginning in July 2010, the 
USED stopped issuing FFELs to new borrowers.64  
Removing FFELs from the student loan market tremendously benefitted 
borrowers seeking PSLF relief. Crucially, FFELs are distinct from Direct 
Loans, and thus are ineligible for forgiveness. President Obama declared that 
ending the FFEL Program would shift borrowers “entirely over to Direct 
Loans”65—the only federal loan that qualified for PSLF at the time.66 By 
 
 58. This is because President Obama was, at latest, termed out in January 2017, and PSLF relief would 
be distributed at earliest in October 2017 (120 months, or 10 years, after the program’s service period began). 
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (limiting a President to two elected terms of office); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 685.219(c)(1)(iii) (requiring 120 separate monthly payments after October 1, 2007). 
 59. Though the USED no longer issues new FFELs, the loans still exist for borrowers who held the loans 
prior to their discontinuation. See Kevin Payne, FFEL Loan Forgiveness and Repayment: What You Should 
Know, STUDENT LOAN PLANNER, https://www.studentloanplanner.com/ffel-loan-forgiveness-repayment-get-
rid-loans/ (Dec. 11, 2020). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Remarks on Education Reform, 1 PUB. PAPERS 550, 552 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
 62. Thomas Ferraro, Congress Approves Obama’s Overhaul of Student Loans, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2010, 
5:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-studentloans/congress-approves-obamas-overhaul-of-student-
loans-idUSN2418677420100326. 
 63. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 2201, 124 Stat. 1029, 
1074 (2010). 
 64. See Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/understand-
aid/types/loans/subsidized-unsubsidized (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (“As a result of legislation that took effect 
July 1, 2010, no further loans are being made under the FFEL Program.”). It is worth noting that this 
legislation only barred the issuance of new FFEL Program loans; borrowers who had FFELs remained on those 
loans. See Payne, supra note 59. 
 65. 1 PUB. PAPERS 550, 552 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
 66. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A). 
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removing a popular loan option which rendered borrowers ineligible for 
forgiveness, and filling the gap with qualifying loans, the Obama 
Administration positioned future applicants to have a higher likelihood of 
meeting PSLF’s requirements.  
After discontinuing the FFEL Program for future borrowers, the Obama 
Administration worked to encourage borrowers who remained on FFELs to 
reconsolidate into a Direct Loan.67 Between January and July 2012, the USED 
offered Special Direct Consolidation Loans (SDCLs),68 and required servicers 
to inform eligible borrowers of the promotion.69 SDCLs allowed borrowers 
holding both a FFEL and a USED-owned loan to consolidate into a single 
Direct Loan, and reduced the interest rate on the consolidated loan by 0.25%.70 
In effect, borrowers who used a SDCL received both a lowered interest rate 
and a PSLF-qualifying federal loan.71 Despite only being offered for six 
months, the SDCL program distributed about $600 million in savings72 and 
directed many borrowers onto a path toward PSLF relief. 
The Obama Administration also created additional income-driven 
repayment plans for borrowers. Before 2011, there were only two income-
driven repayment plans for Direct Loans: Income-Contingent Repayment 
(ICR) and Income-Based Repayment (IBR).73 ICR, which is available to all 
borrowers, fixes monthly payments at the lesser of: (a) 20% of an individual’s 
discretionary income; or (b) a fixed amount for a twelve-year repayment 
 
 67. Press Release, White House, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration to Lower Student Loan 
Payments for Millions of Borrowers (Oct. 25, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2011/ 
10/25/we-cant-wait-obama-administration-lower-student-loan-payments-millions-b; see also Stephen Burd, 
President Obama Uses Executive Order to Make an Important Fix to Direct Lending, NEW AM. (Oct. 26, 
2011), https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/higher-education/higher-ed-watch/president-obama-
uses-executive-order-to-make-an-important-fix-to-direct-lending/. 
 68. Special Direct Consolidation Loans, FED. STUDENT AID (Jan. 9, 2012), http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20120113072420/http:/studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/specialconsolidation.jsp. 
 69. Special Direct Consolidation Loan Information—Short-Term Consolidation Opportunity Offered 
from January–June 30, 2012, FED. STUDENT AID (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120110070017/ 
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/eannouncements/102611SpecialDCLInfoInitial.html. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 9 (2013), https://studentaid.gov/ 
sites/default/files/FY2013FederalStudentAidAnnualReport.pdf (“The initiative disbursed approximately $0.6 
billion in FY 2013.”). 
 73. See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS PROGRAM: 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Q&AS) 3 (2010), https://financialaid.tamu.edu/Forms/IRBPublicLoan 
Forgiveness.aspx (question 13). Note that while the answer lists the “Standard Repayment Plan[] with a 10 
year repayment period” as a qualifying loan, such a plan is functionally useless, as a loan completely repaid 
within ten years has no balance to forgive. See id. For a greater discussion, see supra note 54. 
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plan.74 IBR, which is limited to borrowers with demonstrated financial need, 
caps payments at 10 to 15% of discretionary income.75  
In 2011, the USED created a third income-driven repayment plan: Pay As 
You Earn (PAYE).76 PAYE was available for those who received a Direct 
Loan after 2011 and met an income threshold; it capped loan payments at 10% 
of discretionary income.77 PAYE also capped capitalized interest at 10% of the 
loan’s overall balance.78 The Obama Administration characterized PAYE as an 
affordable alternative to IBR and ICR, and estimated that about 1.6 million 
borrowers qualified for reduced payments under the plan.79 
Four years after PAYE’s implementation, the USED finalized regulations 
for another income-driven repayment program: Revised Pay As You Earn 
(REPAYE).80 REPAYE was available to all Direct Loan holders, and capped 
payments at 10% of a borrower’s discretionary income.81 Though it had 
drawbacks for certain borrowers,82 REPAYE expanded PAYE’s stellar benefits 
to all borrowers with federal loans.  
These initiatives—replacing FFELs with Direct Loans, incentivizing 
consolidation through SDCLs, and creating PAYE and REPAYE—made 
PSLF’s component parts more accessible and palatable to borrowers. By 
expanding opportunities for borrowers to receive Direct Loans and income-
driven repayment plans, the Obama Administration helped set future PSLF 
applicants up for later success. Meanwhile, as President Obama’s second term 
came to an end, a milestone approached: the first year that borrowers could 
apply for forgiveness.  
 
 74. Philip G. Schrag, The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment Option for Law Student Loans, 29 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 770–71, 771 n.193 (2001). 
 75. Kevin J. Smith, The Income-Based Repayment Plans and For-Profit Education: How Does This 
Combination Affect the Question to Include Student Loans in Bankruptcy?, 32 GA. ST. L. REV. 603, 612–14 
(2016). 
 76. Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford 
Federal Direct Loan Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 66,088, 66,088 (Nov. 1, 2012) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 
674, 682, 685). 
 77. Id. at 66,116–17. 
 78. Id. at 66,141 (“After the outstanding principal amount is 10 percent greater than the original amount, 
interest continues to accrue but is not capitalized.”). 
 79. Education Department Launches ‘Pay As You Earn’ Student Loan Repayment Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/education-department-launches-pay-you-earn-
student-loan-repayment-plan. 
 80. Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Family Education Loan Program, and William D. 
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,204, 67,204 (Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 
pts. 668, 682, 685). 
 81. Your Federal Student Loans Just Got Easier to REPAYE, FED. STUDENT AID: HOMEROOM (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://blog.ed.gov/2015/12/your-federal-student-loans-just-got-easier-to-repaye/. 
 82. For example, married couples are disadvantaged under REPAYE, as the program combines both the 
borrower’s income and her spouse’s income to determine discretionary income (and derivative payments). Id. 
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C. RELUCTANCE & FAILURE: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION INHERITS PSLF 
America underwent another political transition in 2016, electing Donald 
Trump to succeed President Obama. This change shifted priorities in the West 
Wing surrounding student loan forgiveness. The Trump Administration’s 
USED, led by Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, showed little sympathy for 
the qualms of student loan borrowers.83 The conflict between this philosophy 
and PSLF’s ideological promise foreshadowed danger for the program just as 
the first wave of forgiveness applications loomed.  
The USED worked to stymie PSLF’s administration even before it began 
accepting applications for forgiveness. In August 2017, the USED terminated 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) it had established with the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) during the Obama Administration.84 
These MOUs, designed to assist “borrowers seeking to resolve” student loan 
complaints, streamlined information sharing and collaborative investigations 
between the two agencies.85 In explaining its action, the USED accused the 
CFPB of overstepping its authority.86 Yet consumer advocates decried the 
move as “short-sighted and counterproductive”87 for protecting borrowers’ 
rights.  
The USED began processing the first wave of PSLF applications under 
this specter, and the initial results were astounding. Of the 28,081 borrowers 
who had applications processed, just 96 received relief—a rejection rate of 
about 99.66%.88 This rate has hardly improved: at the end of 2018, the USED 
 
 83. See Jordan Weissmann, Betsy DeVos Is Wasting No Time Screwing Over Students Who Borrow 
Money for College, SLATE (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://slate.com/business/2017/04/betsy-devos-is-
wasting-no-time-screwing-over-student-borrowers.html. 
 84. Letter from Kathleen Smith, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Off. Of Postsecondary Educ., U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., and A. Wayne Johnson, Chief Operating Officer, Fed. Student Aid, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Richard 
Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Aug. 31, 2017), https://consumerist.com/consumermediallc.files. 
wordpress.com/2017/09/2017-09-01_signed_letter_to_cfpb.pdf; see also Anya Kamenetz, The Department of 
Education Cuts Off a Student Loan Watchdog, NPR:ED (Sept. 20, 2017, 6:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/ed/2017/09/20/551857172/the-department-of-education-cuts-off-a-student-loan-watchdog. 
 85. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. And the U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ. Concerning the Sharing of Info. (Oct. 19, 2011) (on file with Hastings Law Journal); Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Supervisory and Oversight Coop. and Related Info. Sharing Between the U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ. And the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Jan. 9, 2014) (on file with Hastings Law Journal). 
 86. Letter from Kathleen Smith and A. Wayne Jackson to Richard Cordray, supra note 84. 
 87. Ashlee Kieler, Betsy DeVos Refuses to Work with Consumer Protection Agency on Student Loans, 
CONSUMER REPS. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/betsy-devos-refuses-to-work-
with-consumer-protection-agency-on-student-loans/. 
 88. Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-
center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data [hereinafter PSLF Pre-March 2019 Data Report] (click “Pre-March 
2019 PSLF Report” hyperlink to download) (using the figures from the first report labeled “As of 6/30/2018”); 
see also Jillian Berman, This Government Loan Forgiveness Program Has Rejected 99% of Borrowers So Far, 
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 23, 2018, 8:55 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-government-loan-
forgiveness-program-has-rejected-99-of-borrowers-so-far-2018-09-20. 
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had approved relief for 338 out of 53,749 borrowers (a 99.37% rejection 
rate89). As of November 2020, the figure remained well over 98%.90  
Fingers immediately pointed to the Trump Administration as the architect 
of the program’s disastrous rejection rate. Shortly after PSLF’s first results 
were released, the Chicago Sun Times’ Editorial Board published a scathing 
critique:  
We have little doubt that the usual bureaucracy is part of the problem. But 
also we suspect something worse at work: The Trump administration and 
DeVos just don’t give a damn. They’ve already said they want to kill the 
program, whining that it’s just “too complicated.” So why try to make it 
work? An administration that cared about working people would cut through 
the bureaucracy and inefficiency and get that loan forgiveness to those 
whom the program is designed to assist.91  
The editorial encapsulates a core question underlying this Note: who is to 
blame for PSLF’s failure? Are problems rooted in the program’s bureaucratic 
requirements? Did the Trump Administration sabotage PSLF? Could a 
sympathetic administration have avoided this result?  
While the Trump Administration frustrated PSLF’s development, the 
program also holds problems rooted in its statute and implementing 
regulations. PSLF’s fixed requirements made it difficult for borrowers to meet 
qualifying criteria at the time of the program’s creation. Mischievous loan 
servicers, tasked with enforcing the program’s components, further hampered 
this dilemma by deterring borrowers from working toward forgiveness. 
Correctly diagnosing the actions and failures that created these problems is 
essential to designing comprehensive policy that improves the program. 
II.  PINPOINTING FAILURES 
The reasons why many borrowers—over 223,000 as of November 
202092—are denied loan forgiveness provide a useful starting point to 
understanding PSLF’s disastrous rejection rate. According to the USED’s most 
recent report, many applications were rejected for not having a sufficient 
number of qualifying payments (59% of rejections93). Others had missing 
information on their applications (26%94), held ineligible loans (11%95), or 
 
 89. PSLF Pre-March 2019 Data Report, supra note 88 (using the figures from the third report labeled 
“As of 12/31/2018”). 
 90. See discussion supra note 9. 
 91. Editorial, Billionaire Betsy and Her Abandonment of Student Loan Relief for Teachers, Others, CHI. 
SUN TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019, 6:32 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/9/9/20857278/student-loan-debt-
betsy-devos-public-service-loan-forgiveness-trump-administration. 
 92. See November 2020 PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (subtracting row 12 from row 8). 
 93. See id. (row 14). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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lacked enough public service time or worked for non-qualifying employers 
(combined 4%96).  
 
Table 2: Common Reasons for Ineligible PSLF Applications (November 
2020)97 
 
These statistics support two explanations for why PSLF is rejecting an 
astronomical percentage of applicants: (1) that the PSLF program’s statutory 
and regulatory design is problematic, and (2) the Trump Administration 
refused to faithfully administer the program. However, these explanations are 
not mutually exclusive, and understanding all of the program’s problems is 
essential to designing comprehensive policy that corrects its failures.  
A. DISASTROUS DESIGN: CONGRESS & THE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT’S 
SLIPSHOD STATUTE AND REGULATIONS 
A notable feature of PSLF is the specificity of its requirements. The 
program’s statute and implementing regulations set clear qualifications for 
forgiveness: 120 on-time monthly payments, made on a federal Direct Loan, 
using an income-driven repayment plan, while also working full-time in a 
qualifying public service position.100 These requirements restrict the USED’s 
discretion to apply lenient standards when evaluating applications.  
Public policy generally benefits from precise specifications, but the 
advantages of specificity disappear if requirements are too difficult to 
 
 96. In previous PSLF data reports, the USED included “Employer Dates Not Qualified” and “Employer 
Not Eligible” as distinct categories among its reasons for denied applications. See, e.g., Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness Data, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/student/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (click “September 2019 PSLF Report” hyperlink to download) (row 14). In the 
September 2019 PSLF Report, each of these two categories composed 2% apiece of the total denied 
applications. Id. The USED has not explained the removal of these categories; the Author assumes that these 
categories still remain but are no longer reported. 
 97. See November 2020 PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (row 14). These statistics are calculated using 
percentages that pertain to rejected applications, not applicants. The USED does not provide percentages for 
reasons for denial in terms of applicants. 
 98. The USED only provides whole-number percentages when categorizing denied applications. See, 
e.g., id. A rough approximation can be formed by multiplying the percentage and the total number of denied 
applications (263,118), see id. (row 13). Application figures are rounded to the nearest whole number.  
 99. See discussion supra note 96.  
 100. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m)(1)(A). 
Reason for Denied Application % of Denied Applications 
# of Denied 
Applications98 
Qualifying Payments 59% ~155,240 
Missing Information 26% ~68,411 
No Eligible Loans 11% ~28,943 
Employment Dates Not Qualified combined ~4%99 ~10,525 
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achieve.101 This duality undermined the first wave of PSLF applicants. 
Borrowers currently applying for relief began working toward forgiveness ten 
years ago, when many of PSLF’s component requirements were vastly 
underdeveloped. While Congress and the USED created PSLF in hopes of 
incentivizing public service, the program’s statute and implementing 
regulations appeared oblivious102 to the realities of the federal student loan 
system at the time. The following Subparts illustrate the numerous blunders 
embedded within PSLF’s statutory and regulatory design.  
1. Requiring Direct Loans and Income-Driven Repayment Plans 
Congress and the USED’s first blunder came in requiring Direct Loans 
and income-driven repayment plans for forgiveness. In October 2007, the first 
month when payments could be credited toward PSLF, Direct Loans and 
income-driven repayment plans were underdeveloped components of the 
federal student loan market.103 As a result, borrowers had a strong likelihood of 
holding loans that, absent reconsolidation, disqualified them from obtaining 
forgiveness. 
Consider the example of Direct Loans. In 2007, the USED distributed 
Direct Loans to about seven million recipients—under 25% of the nation’s 
28.3 million federal loan borrowers.104 In comparison, roughly 89.75% of 
federal borrowers held a non-qualifying Perkins Loan and/or a FFEL.105 
Consequently, at the time of PSLF’s creation, about nine out of every ten 
borrowers were ineligible for relief on their entire106 federal student loan 
balance.  
A similar story arose for income-driven repayment plans. Federal loans 
generally have three kinds of repayment plans: level (also known as standard), 
graduated, and income-driven.107 Level plans have a fixed monthly payment 
throughout the term, graduated plans have a low monthly payment that 
increases over the term, and income-driven plans have a monthly payment 
 
 101. Generally speaking, program specifications are good because they allow policymakers to direct 
support to a limited and targeted group. However, if those specifications are difficult to achieve, the overall 
use, and therefore effectiveness, of the program diminishes. 
 102. An alternative explanation for PSLF’s restrictive statutory framework is that congressional 
Democrats knew that a bigger proposal (such as making all federal loans eligible for forgiveness) would be 
incredibly costly and thus unacceptable to Republican lawmakers. Regardless of the reason, Congress and the 
USED produced a statutory and regulatory framework that was insufficient and ineffective for student loan 
borrowers. 
 103. See infra Tables 3 and 4 for Federal Loan Portfolio statistics. 
 104. See infra Table 3 for 2007 Federal Loan Portfolio statistics. 
 105. Id. 
 106. A caveat: there are borrowers who have a combination of qualifying loans and non-qualifying loans. 
Individuals therefore could receive relief on their PSLF-qualifying loans, but still not have their entire loan 
balance forgiven. 
 107. Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/repayment/plans (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
976 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:959 
calculated using the borrower’s annual income.108 PSLF requires that 
qualifying payments be made on an income-driven repayment plan. Yet as of 
2013,109 six years after payments and service time began qualifying for PSLF, 
only 47.34% of federal student loans were paid via an income-driven 
repayment plan.110  
 
Table 3: Distribution and Percentages of Direct Loans and Non-PSLF 
Qualifying Loans Among Federal Student Loan Borrowers, 
2007 to 2020111 
 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. The USED has not provided any pre-2013 statistics on the distribution of repayment plans. 
 110. See infra Table 3 for 2013 Direct Loan repayment plan statistics. 
 111. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/ 
student/portfolio (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (click “Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary” hyperlink to 
downloaded). The figures used in this citation are either the individual years themselves, or, if quarterly-
distributions are provided for a year, the final quarter (Q4) of that year. 
 
FY 
Direct Loans Non-Qualifying Loans  (Perkins, FFEL) 
# of 
borrowers 




% of federal 
borrowers 
2007 7.0 mil. 24.73% 25.4 mil. 89.75% 
2008 7.7 mil. 25.75% 26.6 mil. 88.96% 
2009 9.2 mil. 28.66% 28.0 mil. 87.23% 
2010 14.4 mil. 41.98% 28.0 mil. 81.63% 
2011 19.4 mil. 53.15% 26.7 mil. 73.15% 
2012 22.8 mil. 59.53% 25.3 mil. 66.06% 
2013 25.6 mil. 64.65% 23.8 mil. 60.10% 
2014 27.9 mil. 68.55% 22.3 mil. 54.79% 
2015 29.9 mil. 71.88% 20.7 mil. 49.76% 
2016 31.5 mil. 74.47% 19.1 mil. 45.15% 
2017 33.0 mil. 77.46% 17.4 mil. 40.85% 
2018 34.2 mil. 79.72% 15.8 mil. 36.83% 
2019 35.1 mil. 81.82% 14.1 mil. 32.87% 
2020 35.9 mil. 83.68% 12.7 mil. 29.60% 
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Table 4: Distribution and Percentages of Level, Graduated, and Income-
Driven Repayment Plans Among Federal Student Loan Borrowers, 

























2013 1.58 mil. 0.30 mil. 1.69 mil. 52.66% 47.34% 
2014 1.61 mil. 0.27 mil. 2.77 mil. 40.43% 59.57% 
2015 1.64 mil. 0.27 mil. 4.21 mil. 31.21% 68.79% 
2016 1.65 mil. 0.28 mil. 5.58 mil. 25.70% 74.30% 
2017 1.70 mil. 0.30 mil. 6.49 mil. 23.56% 76.44% 
2018 1.69 mil. 0.32 mil. 7.21 mil. 21.80% 78.20% 
2019 1.70 mil. 0.34 mil. 7.77 mil. 20.80% 79.20% 
2020 1.73 mil. 0.35 mil. 8.23 mil. 20.17% 79.83% 
 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the annual proportion of PSLF-qualifying loans 
as a part of the entire market of federal student loan products. Table 3, which 
segments federal loan borrowers into holders of Direct Loans and non-Direct 
Loans, shows that as of 2011 (the latest time one could begin payments to 
apply for forgiveness today), 73.15% of federal loan holders held a non-Direct 
Loan, disqualifying them from receiving complete forgiveness.113  
Table 4, which segments Direct Loan holders into income-driven 
repayment plans and non-qualifying repayment plans, paints a similar picture. 
As of 2013, 52.66% of Direct Loan holders were on non-income-driven 
repayment plans, which are ineligible for PSLF relief.114 While the USED has 
not released pre-2013 data, borrowers who took out federal loans before 2011 
only had two (arguably inferior115) income-driven repayment plans available 
for use. Put simply, applicants who currently file for forgiveness likely hold a 
federal loan that is ineligible for relief. 
 
 112. Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/data-center/ 
student/portfolio (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (click “Portfolio by Repayment Plan (DL, ED-Held FFEL, ED-
Owned)” hyperlink to download). The figures used in this citation are those of the final quarter (Q4) of that 
year. For simplicity, all qualifying income-driven plans are aggregated in this table. 
 113. See “FY 2010” row supra Table 3. 
 114. See “FY 2013” row supra Table 4. 
 115. For PSLF purposes, most borrowers are best off choosing PAYE if they qualify; if not, REPAYE, 
IBR, and ICR (in that order) are generally recommended for having an income-driven repayment plan. See 
Which Is the Best Income-Driven Repayment Plan?, CAPPEX, https://www.cappex.com/articles/money/best-
income-driven-repayment-plan (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
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Borrowers with loan plans other than a Direct Loan with an income-
driven repayment plan typically receive a PSLF denial that is categorized as 
not having an “eligible loan.”116 As of November 2020, this group comprised 
11% of rejections (about 28,900 applications).117 In future years, applicants 
seeking forgiveness are more likely to have Direct Loans and income-driven 
repayment plans because of the Obama Administration’s work to expand 
access to both requirements.  
Borrowers who only fail to meet the income-driven repayment 
requirement may still receive relief. In response to PSLF’s high rejection rate, 
Congress created Temporary Expanded Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
(TEPSLF).118 TEPSLF extended forgiveness to borrowers who were denied 
relief under PSLF solely for failing to make income-driven repayments, 
provided that the final payment made on the Direct Loan and the payment 
made exactly one year before that one equaled the amounts the borrower 
would have paid on an income-driven payment plan.119 However, the limited 
data available for TEPSLF still remains concerning. A Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, published in 2019, found that out of 
54,184 TEPSLF applicants, 53,523 were turned away—a rejection rate of 
98.78%.120 
One explanation for TEPSLF’s rate is a procedural prerequisite: the 
program automatically denies forgiveness for borrowers who lack a PSLF 
rejection.121 However, even after removing those 38,068 applications,122 
TEPSLF still only approved 661 out of 16,116 borrowers—a rejection rate of 
95.89%. The GAO Report provides reasons for the 15,455 denials: 5589 
(36.16%) had not been repaying loans for ten years; 3078 (19.92%) failed to 
meet the final payment minimums; and the rest were categorized as: not 
enough qualifying payments, no qualifying federal loans, less than ten years of 
work for a qualifying employer, or other categories.123  
 
 116. The USED defines this category as: “The borrower has requested forgiveness but the borrower does 
not have Direct Loans that are eligible to participate in the PSLF program. Typically, these borrowers have 
FFEL, Perkins or private/non-federal loans.” November 2020 PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (row 11 of the 
“Definitions” tab). 
 117. See supra Table 2. It is worth noting that this figure does not include “de facto rejections”—
individuals who took out loans, went into public sector positions, and made on-time payments, only to later not 
apply for forgiveness because they realized their loans were not eligible for PSLF. The number of individuals 
in this category may be large, but there is no sufficient way of determining that figure. 
 118. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 315, 132 Stat. 348, 752 (2018). 
 119. Id. 
 120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-595, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS: IMPROVING 
THE TEMPORARY EXPANDED PROCESS COULD HELP REDUCE BORROWER CONFUSION 12 fig.2 (2019), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/701157.pdf. 
 121. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Announces Opportunity for 
Federal Student Loan Borrowers to Be Reconsidered for Public Service Loan Forgiveness (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-opportunity-federal-student-
loan-borrowers-be-reconsidered-public-service-loan-forgiveness. 
 122. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 120, at 13 fig.3. 
 123. Id. 
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Crucially, interested borrowers who discover that they are on a 
disqualifying plan have limited methods to enter a track to forgiveness. Upon 
discovering that their loans are ineligible for PSLF, a borrower would likely 
reconsolidate into a qualifying package. However, reconsolidation resets one’s 
progress toward forgiveness, and a borrower still must make 120 payments on 
the qualifying plan.124 Effectively, the later a borrower reconsolidates, the 
fewer benefits she receives from eventual relief—and that assumes she is 
willing to make another ten years’ worth of payments and service.  
PSLF’s rigid statutory and regulatory requirements were ill-fitted to the 
realities of America’s student loan industry. While Congress and the USED 
aspired to create a comprehensive program that incentivized public service for 
all, their framework required loan components that, at the time, were vastly 
underdeveloped and uncommon. Combining this difficulty with inflexible 
regulations effectively destined PSLF and TEPSLF applicants for failure.  
2. Having Servicers Track Payments and Manage Program Access 
Congress and the USED also blundered in having loan servicers 
administer and track PSLF’s requirements.125 Loan servicers are intermediaries 
between borrowers and lenders: they collect loan payments, assist during 
periods of deferment or forbearance, and assess eligibility for forgiveness 
programs.126 PSLF forces borrowers to interact with their servicers in two 
ways. First, because PSLF requires income-driven repayment plans, a 
borrower must annually recertify her updated income to the loan servicer.127 
Second, if a borrower wishes to consolidate toward PSLF-qualifying loans or 
track her current progress, she must contact her servicer to execute those 
actions. These interactions create unique problems for borrowers.  
Before describing the numerous servicer problems that PSLF-seeking 
borrowers have encountered, it is important to outline the role that servicers 
play in administering the program. When a borrower obtains a federal loan, she 
 
 124. This is because all prior payments made were on ineligible PSLF plans; the USED does not credit 
ineligible payments towards forgiveness. 
 125. To be clear, Congress and the USED did not explicitly delegate the responsibility of tracking a 
borrower’s PSLF qualifications to student loan servicers; both PSLF’s statutory text and implementing 
regulations do not contain the term “servicer.” However, the federal student loan program is entirely 
administered through loan servicers. Who’s My Student Loan Serviceer?, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/repayment/servicers (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (“A loan servicer is a 
company that [the USED] assign[s] to handle the billing and other services on your federal student loan on [the 
USED’s] behalf . . . .”). Congress and the USED could have avoided this problem through a variety of 
different measures, including creating an office within the Education Department to assist with administering 
PSLF relief. 
 126. John Egan, What Is a Student Loan Servicer?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.: LOANS (Jan. 4, 2019, 9:00 
AM), https://loans.usnews.com/what-is-a-student-loan-servicer. 
 127. See What Is Income-Driven Repayment?, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/app/ 
ibrInstructions.action (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (informing borrowers that under an income-driven plan, they 
“will be required to come back and recertify [their] income information each year”). 
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is assigned one of the USED’s many loan servicers.128 The servicer serves as 
the primary point-of-contact for the borrower. However, when a borrower 
formally declares an intent129 to pursue PSLF, the loan is shifted to the only 
servicer that processes PSLF loans: FedLoan Servicing (FedLoan).130  
This USED-designed framework creates an odd dilemma for all student 
loan servicers besides FedLoan. At any point before a borrower declares her 
intent to pursue forgiveness, a servicer must continue to assist the borrower, 
including with any PSLF-related inquiries. However, as soon as a borrower 
officially announces this intent, the servicer must transfer the loan to FedLoan. 
Thus, servicers are financially motivated to turn borrowers away from PSLF: 
once a borrower decides to pursue forgiveness, a servicer loses a customer and 
any further interest revenue to FedLoan.131 Yet paradoxically, Congress and 
the USED positioned servicers perfectly to discourage PSLF’s use. Servicers 
employ a variety of strategies to turn borrowers away from forgiveness. A 
sampling of anecdotes, publicized through media reports and litigation, are 
provided to illustrate these tactics.  
First, servicers can discourage borrowers from considering PSLF by 
providing inaccurate program information. In 2011, after hearing about PSLF, 
a first-grade teacher from Maryland asked her servicer about 
reconsolidation.132 The servicer’s customer service representative (CSR) 
informed her that all 120 payments needed to be consecutive and on-time, and 
just one missed payment would derail her eligibility.133 Of course, that 
 
 128. See Egan, supra note 126. 
 129. Prior to submitting an application for forgiveness, a borrower may formally declare her intent to 
pursue PSLF by submitting a PSLF Employment Certification Form (ECF) to the USED. Section 2 of the ECF 
requires a borrower to certify that “[b]y submitting this form, [the borrower’s] student loan(s) held by the 
Department may be transferred to FedLoan Servicing.” FED. STUDENT AID, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 
FORGIVENESS (PSLF) & TEMPORARY EXPANDED PSLF (TEPSLF) EMPLOYMENT CERTIFICATION & 
APPLICATION § 2, cl. 4, https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/public-service-employment-certification-
form.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 130. Anna Helhoski, FedLoan Servicing Customer Service: What It Can Do and How to Contact, 
NERDWALLET (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/fedloan-servicing-
student-loans#:~:text=FedLoan%20is%20the%20only%20federal,working%20for%20an%20eligible%20 
employer. 
 131. The Student Borrower Protection Center writes that: 
[Servicers] have a financial disincentive that discourages these companies from providing adequate 
and actionable information to borrowers trying [to] get on track for PSLF. Specifically, once a 
borrower is advised of her right to pursue PSLF and takes action to get on track, the borrower 
would have to immediately consolidate her loan—costing the lender future interest revenue and 
costing the loan servicer a customer. 
STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. & AM. FED. OF TEACHERS, KEEPING THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN 
FORGIVENESS 11 (2018), https://protectborrowers.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/SBPC-AFT-PSLF-
Investigation.pdf (footnote omitted). 
 132. Stacy Cowley, Teachers Sue Navient, Claiming Student Loan Forgiveness Failures, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/business/student-loan-forgiveness-lawsuit.html. 
 133. Id. 
March 2021] AMERICA’S UNFORGIVING FORGIVENESS PROGRAM 981 
statement is incorrect,134 yet the teacher chose to not apply for PSLF because 
of the misinformation.135  
Second, servicers may use PSLF’s appeal to encourage borrowers to 
accept various student loan promotions, yet provide packages that are 
ineligible for forgiveness. FedLoan once advertised a “Consolidation Quiz” 
which, if a borrower answered that she hoped to lower her monthly payments 
and qualify for PSLF, informed her that “[c]onsolidation could be right for 
you!”136 However, lowered monthly payments and PSLF qualification are 
mutually exclusive: a lowered monthly payment signals the use of a graduated 
repayment plan, which is ineligible for forgiveness.137 While the servicer 
secures future revenue,138 the borrower believes she is on track for 
forgiveness—only to discover differently later.  
Third, servicers may incorrectly inform ineligible borrowers that they 
qualify for forgiveness. For example, a Floridian meteorologist was repeatedly 
told by his servicer that forgiveness was within reach.139 He then discovered, 
after ten years of timely payments and public service, that none of his 
payments counted toward forgiveness because he lacked Direct Loans.140 If the 
meteorologist remained interested in obtaining forgiveness, he would have to 
reconsolidate into a Direct Loan, and then make another ten years’ worth of 
service and payments.  
Finally, servicers may require a combination of phone calls and physical 
forms to reconsolidate loans into PSLF-qualifying packages, turning the 
reconsolidation process into an arduous ordeal.141 In contrast, forbearance—an 
option that would slow one’s progress toward forgiveness—is easily applied 
via a simple phone call.142  
It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned servicer actions do not 
unequivocally demonstrate a servicer’s intent to mislead borrowers. These 
problems could be the result of poor CSR training or imposing performance 
standards. For example, a servicer could encourage CSRs to limit each service 
call to ten minutes to maximize efficiency. However, even if these problems 
are attributable to administrative issues, the industry still epitomizes the 
 
 134. Payments for PSLF need not be consecutive, and a late (or missed) payment does not disqualify a 
borrower from receiving eventual relief. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID, 
https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 135. Cowley, supra note 132. 
 136. Complaint at 55, New York v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1:19-cv-09155 (S.D.N.Y 
Oct. 3, 2019). 
 137. Id. at 54–55. 
 138. See STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. & AM. FED. OF TEACHERS, supra note 131, at 11. 
 139. Cowley, supra note 132. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Complaint at 51, supra note 136. 
 142. Id. 
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principal-agent dilemma.143 Servicers have little incentive to provide borrowers 
with accurate PSLF information because the servicers stand to lose future 
interest if the borrower declares her intent to pursue forgiveness.144 
Reconsolidating a borrower’s loans toward PSLF qualification requires effort, 
and the beneficiary of this effort is the borrower, not the servicer. The dilemma 
also explains why servicers are uninterested in investing in solutions to resolve 
administrative inefficiencies.  
Beyond this first issue, the loan recertification process is also fraught with 
servicer delays, jeopardizing a borrower’s ability to make on-time payments. 
Recertification is a process where a borrower provides her servicer with 
current income information.145 That information is used to calculate an updated 
income-based payment every year.146 During recertification, however, a 
servicer places the borrower in forbearance, a status that prevents additional 
payments from being made while the income-based payment is updated.147 
This is problematic because recertification can stretch for months, leaving 
borrowers in limbo.148 Each month in forbearance delays a borrower’s path to 
forgiveness, as she cannot make timely qualifying payments, nor can she make 
up missed payments because of PSLF’s restriction on lump-sum 
contributions.149 For no fault of their own, borrowers are either delayed from 
qualifying for forgiveness, or worse, believe that they have made sufficient 
payments during ten years of work, only to have their application rejected.  
In the USED’s PSLF datasets, borrowers who have payments delayed by 
recertification lack “qualifying payments.”150 As of November 2020, this group 
composed 59% of all rejected applications, affecting about 115,000 
 
 143. See Susan Dynarski, An Economist’s Perspective on Student Loans in the United States 11 (Econ. 
Stud. at Brookings Working Paper, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ 
economist_perspective_student_loans_dynarski.pdf. 
 144. See STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. & AM. FED. OF TEACHERS, supra note 131, at 11. 
 145. See Income-Driven Repayment Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/manage-loans/ 
repayment/plans/income-driven (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Federal Student Loan Forbearance Options, EDVISORS, https://www.edvisors.com/repay-
student-loans/federal/suspend/forbearance/?google=amp (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (noting that administrative 
forbearance may be applied “while the lender is collecting and processing documentation of a borrower’s 
eligibility for loan forgiveness under the income-based repayment plan”). 
 148. Seth Frotman, When You Make Student Loan Payments on an Income-Driven Plan, You Might Be in 
for a Payment Shock, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/blog/when-you-make-student-loan-payments-on-an-income-driven-plan-you-might-be-in-for-a-
payment-shock/. 
 149. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), EDVISORS, https://www.edvisors.com/repay-student-
loans/federal/cancel/forgiveness/public-service/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (“Lump-sum payments, even if 
treated as a prepayment of future payments, do not count.”). 
 150. The USED defines this category as: “The borrower submitted a completed application and was 
reviewed to determine if the payments made qualify based on the criteria for the program (on-time, in full, on a 
qualifying repayment plan, while working at a qualifying employer). The results show the borrower has not 
made 120 qualifying payments.” See November 2020 PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (row 25 of the 
“Definitions” tab). 
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applications.151 It is unlikely that all borrowers in this category lacked 
qualifying payments solely because of servicer delays. However, recent 
litigation suggests that these delays are common. In August 2017, the office of 
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey sued FedLoan’s operators in 
state court, alleging that the servicer’s delays inexcusably slowed borrowers’ 
pursuit of forgiveness.152  
Similarly, in October 2019, the office of New York Attorney General 
Letitia James sued FedLoan’s operators in federal court, alleging that FedLoan 
was failing in its servicing of PSLF loans.153 The numerous allegations detailed 
FedLoan’s inability to accurately count PSLF qualifying payments,154 delays in 
processing income certifications,155 and failure in explaining its determinations 
when disqualifying certain payments.156 While litigation remains in 
preliminary stages, its existence magnifies the USED’s error in allowing a 
single loan servicing agency to service PSLF’s component requirements. In 
doing so, Congress colloquially allowed a loan servicing fox to guard a 
henhouse of borrowers, and the fox took full advantage.  
B. APATHETIC ADMINISTRATION: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
SABOTAGE 
While PSLF’s requirements are embedded within a rigid statutory 
framework, the Trump Administration still worked to diminish the program’s 
effectiveness. These actions, from enforcing narrowed definitions of qualifying 
public service, to obstructing oversight over loan servicers, limited PSLF’s 
accessibility to many public servants.  
1. Public Service: An “Arbitrary and Capricious” Interpretation  
While many of PSLF’s requirements have clear standards, what qualifies 
as “public service” is rather ambiguous. The program’s originating statute 
defines the term as: 
a full-time job in emergency management, government, military service, 
public safety, law enforcement, public health, public education (including 
early childhood education), social work in a public child or family service 
agency, public interest law services (including prosecution or public defense 
or legal advocacy in low-income communities at a nonprofit organization), 
public child care, public service for individuals with disabilities, public 
 
 151. See supra Table 2. 
 152. Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2, 2018 WL 
1137520, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2018); Complaint at 10, Commonwealth v. Pa. Higher Educ. 
Assistance Agency, No. 1784CV02682-BLS2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2017). 
 153. Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., AG James Sues Student Loan Servicer for 
Mismanaging Loan Forgiveness Program (Oct. 3, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/ag-james-sues-
student-loan-servicer-mismanaging-loan-forgiveness-program. 
 154. Complaint, supra note 136, at 14–18. 
 155. Id. at 30–35. 
 156. Id. at 22–30. 
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service for the elderly, public library sciences, school-based library sciences 
and other school-based services, or at an organization that is described in 
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from 
taxation under section 501(a) of such Code . . . .157  
Parsing the statute suggests that “public service” applies to: (1) work in 
government, (2) work at a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) organization, and (3) a full-time 
job, with any other type of employer, in the listed fields.158 However, the 
Trump Administration imposed additional requirements for certain employers 
to qualify: the USED required borrowers to attest that their employer’s 
“primary purpose” was to provide public service.159 Put differently, an 
organization that served the public in one of the statute’s listed fields, but 
primarily focused on a non-public mission, was not considered public 
service.160 The addition left many borrowers who worked in the same positions 
and fields as PSLF-qualified borrowers without a prospect of forgiveness. 
One notorious example of this dilemma is the American Bar Association 
(ABA). The ABA is an organization that provides public interest law services 
and advances legal education initiatives, but primarily serves the betterment of 
the legal community.161 Many jobs within the ABA likely met the CCRAA’s 
definition of public service, but failed the USED’s “primary purpose” 
requirement.162 These dueling standards became the subject of litigation. In 
2016, the ABA sued the USED because the Department refused to recertify the 
ABA as a qualifying employer.163 As the Trump Administration transitioned 
in, it defended the classification, but made two arguments not employed by the 
Obama Administration: (1) that certifications were preliminary and always 
subject to future approval,164 and (2) the ABA failed the newly-created primary 
purpose test.165 In February 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
 
 157. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401, 121 Stat. 784, 801 
(2007). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See FED. STUDENT AID, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (PSLF): APPLICATION FOR 
FORGIVENESS, http://web.archive.org/web/20200116112646/https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/public-
service-application-for-forgiveness.pdf [hereinafter PSLF JANUARY 2020 APPLICATION FORM] (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2021) (asking borrowers who work for non-governmental, non-501(c)(3) employers to certify that an 
employer’s “primary purpose” falls into a listed category). 
 160. Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 161. Id. at 13. 
 162. ABA Sues over Public Service Loan Forgiveness Denials, A.B.A. FOR L. STUDENTS (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://abaforlawstudents.com/2016/12/20/aba-sues-public-service-loan-forgiveness-denials/. 
 163. Id. (noting that the Obama Administration’s USED had previously certified the ABA as a public 
service employer). 
 164. Lorelei Laird, In Answer to ABA Lawsuit, Education Department Says It Never Changed Loan 
Forgiveness Rules, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 28, 2017, 6:50 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
in_answer_to_aba_lawsuit_education_department_says_it_never_changed_loan_fo. 
 165. Am. Bar Ass’n, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 25. 
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Columbia found that the “primary purpose” requirement was “arbitrary and 
capricious”166 and ordered the USED to vacate its use.167  
Despite the District Court’s order, the USED continued enforcing the 
invalidated requirement for nearly a year after the decision.168 As late as 
January 2020, Question 13 of the forgiveness application required borrowers to 
identify their employer’s primary purpose among a list of PSLF-qualifying 
fields, and instructed those who could not find a listed primary purpose to not 
apply.169 Only between January and April 2020 did the USED revise170 the 
PSLF application to remove all references to an employer’s primary 
purpose.171  
It is difficult to estimate the impact of the USED’s continued use of the 
primary purpose rule post-decision because that group includes an unknown 
number of de facto rejections. This term refers to borrowers who obeyed 
Question 13’s instructions and did not submit an application because their 
employer’s primary purpose was not listed. Borrowers who submitted an 
application despite not finding a listed primary purpose would have their 
denials categorized within the USED’s datasets as “Employer Not Eligible.”172 
However, that category inexplicably disappeared from the USED’s data reports 
in December 2019. In September 2019, the last report that listed “Employer 
Not Eligible” as a category, the group composed 2% of all rejections.173 
Notably, 2% of over 263,000 rejected applications is still a large figure and 
does not include the aforementioned de facto rejections. Combining those two 
groups together may comprise a significant number of borrowers who were 
denied forgiveness because the Trump Administration continued to enforce an 
invalidated interpretation of public service.  
 
 166. The judge noted that the USED lacked a “reasoned analysis” for implementing the primary purpose 
standard and failed to take “into account the serious reliance interests affected.” Id. at 17. 
 167. Id. at 40. 
 168. See PSLF JANUARY 2020 APPLICATION FORM, supra note 159, at 2 (question 13). 
 169. Id. 
 170. It is certainly possible that the (at least) eleven-month delay between the District Court’s order and 
the USED’s corrections could be the result of bureaucratic inefficiencies. Any changes to the PSLF application 
form could require review by both interagency attorneys and specialists in the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). That said, such a lengthy delay for a simple adjustment (removing one question) appears 
inconsistent with the immediacy and urgency of the District Court’s order. 
 171. Compare PSLF JANUARY 2020 APPLICATION FORM, supra note 159, with FED. STUDENT AID, PUBLIC 
SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS (PSLF): APPLICATION FOR FORGIVENESS, https://studentaid.gov/sites/ 
default/files/public-service-application-for-forgiveness.pdf [hereinafter PSLF CURRENT APPLICATION] (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 172. The USED defines this category as: “The borrower submitted an application that is requesting 
forgiveness based on an employer that has been deemed ineligible for the PSLF program.” See November 2020 
PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (row 29 of the “Definitions” tab). 
 173. See discussion supra note 96. 
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2. Obstructing Oversight 
The Trump Administration also hindered meaningful oversight over 
student loan servicers. These actions, which obstructed investigations by both 
federal and state agency officials, provided carte blanche for servicers to 
operate without investigations and sanctions. 
On the federal agency level, the USED severely limited the CFPB’s 
ability to investigate servicer abuses. In April 2019, then-CFPB Director Kathy 
Kraninger revealed that Bureau investigators attempted to investigate the 
USED’s Direct Loans servicers.174 However, the servicers were uncooperative, 
telling CFPB investigators that the USED instructed them to refuse 
information production requests over privacy concerns.175 While the Bureau’s 
leadership had discretion to litigate the servicers’ noncompliance with Bureau 
investigators, then-Director Kraninger chose “not to pick that fight.”176 In 
short, the Trump Administration’s USED scuttled the CFPB’s efforts to 
investigate servicers, while the Bureau’s Director (appointed by President 
Trump) elected to not litigate the USED’s obstruction. These efforts blocked 
federal officials from investigating servicers and recommending fixes to limit 
abuses.177 
Additionally, the USED provided loan servicers with legal cover from 
state enforcement actions. In 2019, a group of Attorneys General from twenty-
one states requested that then-Secretary DeVos “reverse the limitations” the 
USED enacted to prevent servicers from sharing loan information with state 
law enforcement agencies.178 Under previous administrations, federal and state 
law enforcement agencies operated dual oversight roles over the loan servicing 
industry, and worked together to secure significant protections and relief for 
borrowers.179 But during the Trump Administration, that relationship turned 
frosty, chilling any collaboration between federal and state agents to check 
servicers and ensure compliance with consumer protection laws.  
 
 174. Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Sen., 
Addressing Concerns over CFPB Actions (Apr. 23, 2019), https://legacy.npr.org/documents/ 
2019/may/042319-letter.pdf (“Since December 2017, student loan servicers have declined to produce 
information requested by the Bureau for supervisory examinations related to Direct Loans and Federal Family 
Education Loan Program (FFELP) loans held by the Department based on the Department’s guidance.”). 
 175. Chris Arnold, CFPB Chief Says Education Department Is Blocking Student Loan Oversight, NPR: 
BUSINESS (May 16, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/16/723568597/cfpb-chief-says-education-
department-is-blocking-student-loan-oversight. 
 176. Chris Arnold, Exclusive: Turf War Blocked CFPB from Helping Fix Student Loan Forgiveness 
Program, NPR (Oct. 15, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/15/769326896/exclusive-turf-war-
blocked-cfpb-from-helping-fix-student-loan-forgiveness-progra. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Letter from the Att’ys Gen. of Colo., N.J., Wash., Cal., Conn., Del., D.C., Haw., Ill., Iowa, Md., 
Mass., Mich., Minn., Nev., N.Y., N.C., Or., Pa., R.I., and Va., to Betsy DeVos, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
Raising Concerns of Private Servicer Disclosures (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/ 
News%20Documents/Final%20AGs%20Letter%20to%20DOE%204.4.19.pdf. 
 179. Id. at 3. 
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All of these problems—an ineffective statutory and regulatory scheme, 
servicer misconduct, shifting standards for qualifying employment, and 
inadequate oversight over student loan markets—contributed to PSLF’s current 
failures. As discussed in the next Part, the complexity of these intertwined 
issues requires immediate action to ensure that the program can succeed. 
III.  THE IMPERATIVE OF IMMEDIATE AND SWEEPING REFORM 
Some student loan industry experts have speculated that PSLF will soon 
correct itself via the “snowball effect.” The snowball effect is a theory180 that 
the program, aided by Obama Administration reforms, will collect qualified 
borrowers and eventually create an “exponentially increasing” PSLF success 
rate.181 However, a passive approach does not adequately address PSLF’s 
problems. While the Obama Administration’s initiatives have certainly 
directed borrowers toward PSLF-qualifying loans, they do not check for the 
nefarious actions of servicers or political interference from the Executive 
Branch. Moreover, the program has been targeted for cuts by politicians on 
both sides of the aisle—jeopardizing the ability of PSLF to correct itself before 
major changes are implemented. This Part will detail the reasons why 
comprehensive solutions are essential to resolving the program’s problems.  
A. THE “SNOWBALL EFFECT” IS INSUFFICIENT 
The concept behind the snowball effect is overly simple; it fails to 
account for the nefarious actions of servicers and ignores present-day statistics 
that show many borrowers are still disqualified from earning forgiveness. As 
demonstrated by those rejected under TEPSLF,182 the Obama Administration’s 
measures cannot correct for servicer abuse or any rules that subsequent 
administrations implement to limit employer eligibility.183  
Moreover, empirical data suggest that a substantial number of borrowers 
are not on track for forgiveness. Table 3 indicates that as of 2020—over a 
decade after some of the Obama Administration’s reforms went into effect—
nearly 30% of federal loan borrowers still hold a Perkins Loan or FFEL, 
 
 180. For example, Travis Hornsby, founder of “Student Loan Planner,” a popular student loan consulting 
service, argues in a podcast that PSLF is about to enter a “snowball effect” where the program, aided by 
Obama Administration reforms, will collect more qualified borrowers over time. See Travis Hornsby, Episode 
2: What is the PSLF Snowball?, STUDENT LOAN PLANNER (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.studentloanplanner.com/ 
podcast-what-is-pslf-snowball/. 
 181. Travis Hornsby, Why the PSLF Success Rate Will Hit Over 50% by 2024, STUDENT LOAN PLANNER 
(Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.studentloanplanner.com/pslf-snowball-effect/. 
 182. For a discussion of TEPSLF, see supra Part II.A.2. 
 183. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2019) (identifying 
three new standards that the Department of Education used to assess PSLF applications: the aforementioned 
“primary purpose” standard, the “School-like Setting” standard, and the “Outright Provision of Services” 
standard). 
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disqualifying them from receiving complete forgiveness.184 Table 4 illustrates 
a similar problem: in 2020, roughly 20% of Direct Loans borrowers held a 
level or graduated repayment plan, making them ineligible for relief.185 
Obviously, not every federal loan borrower is interested in pursuing 
forgiveness. However, there are bound to be some PSLF-interested borrowers 
who are ultimately denied relief because they hold a disqualifying loan.  
Any PSLF analysis is caveated by a larger issue: there is no consensus on 
what an acceptable rejection rate is. There are no debt relief programs that 
come close to PSLF’s broad scope of professions and depth of forgiveness. At 
the federal level, IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE offer taxable loan forgiveness for 
borrowers after twenty or twenty-five years of on-time payments.186 However, 
there is no data on the efficacy of these federal programs: not enough time has 
elapsed for a borrower to obtain forgiveness.187 Meanwhile, although states 
offer a variety of loan forgiveness plans, they are often limited in scope and 
forgiveness.188  
Manufacturing a “successful” rejection rate illustrates another concern: 
cost. Between October 2017 and November 2020, the 3776 borrowers who 
obtained relief eliminated over $290 million in debt—an average discharge of 
$76,906 per person.189 Assuming that average held, a rejection rate of 80% on 
the current pool of applicants would still lead to over 45,000 students receiving 
over $3.50 billion in relief.190 At a 50% rejection rate, the cost would be about 
$8.74 billion.191  
PSLF, effectively, faces a double bind. Its rigid statutory text and 
insufficient regulatory framework deny relief to a substantial percentage of 
applicants. Yet the program’s astronomically high rejection rate has kept costs 
low. If PSLF did successfully self-correct, the granted relief could add billions 
to the USED’s budget.192 Indeed, this possible budgetary clog has created 
 
 184. See “FY 2019” row supra Table 3. 
 185. See “FY 2019” row supra Table 4. 
 186. Unlike PSLF, however, loan forgiveness offered through the IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE plans may 
be considered taxable income. Tax Penalty Hits Student Loan Borrowers in Income-Driven Repayment Plans 
for the First Time, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://ticas.org/affordability-2/tax-
penalty-hits-student-loan-borrowers-income-driven-repayment-plans-first-time/. 
 187. IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE repayment plans were made available in 2007, 2011, and 2015, 
respectively; the earliest any borrower could qualify for relief under twenty years of forgiveness solely by 
using these programs would be 2027. See Income-Driven Repayment Plan, supra note 145. 
 188. See Student Loan Forgiveness Programs by State, COLL. INVESTOR, https://thecollegeinvestor.com/ 
student-loan-forgiveness-programs-by-state/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (listing different state-run student loan 
forgiveness programs; such programs offer fixed forgiveness amounts and/or are limited to a particular 
industry). 
 189. See November 2020 PSLF Data Report, supra note 8 (rows 15–17). 
 190. Calculated by multiplying a 20% acceptance rate with the 227,382 unique borrowers who have 
applied for PSLF, and then multiplying that figure by the average relief of $76,906 per borrower. 
 191. Calculated by multiplying a 50% acceptance rate with the 227,382 unique borrowers who have 
applied for PSLF, and then multiplying that figure by the average relief of $76,906 per person. 
 192. Note that cost itself is not a concern for PSLF: The USED has not set any limits on the forgiveness 
distributed, and so program money will not run out. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE 
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another threat preventing PSLF from slowly correcting itself: political 
intervention.  
B. CAPPING BENEFITS DISPROPORTIONATELY HARMS GRADUATE STUDENTS 
As PSLF’s potential costs mount, politicians have proposed drastic cuts—
threatening changes before the program could possibly “snowball” toward 
success. In 2014, President Obama’s administration proposed limiting PSLF’s 
benefits to $57,500 per borrower.193 The limitation was appealing to budget 
hawks, as the proposal held an estimated $6.7 billion in potential savings.194 
However, the proposed cap was never introduced in Congress.195  
In hindsight, the Obama Administration’s cap of $57,500 comes 
somewhat close to the $76,906 average that successful PSLF applicants have 
received. However, the proposed cap disproportionately harms borrowers who 
hold far more debt. This qualm acutely affects graduate and professional 
students,196 and becomes apparent through a hypothetical with some back-of-
the-napkin math. Suppose an incoming law student aspired to work as a public 
defender and took out federal loans to fund her legal education. The median 
debt of a law school graduate hovers around $110,000.197 The median entry 
salary for a law school graduate at a public defender’s office is $58,300.198 
PSLF-qualifying loans calculate a monthly payment at 10% of income,199 and 
interest rates for graduate students are set at 6.08%.200 Graduate student 
borrowers must also pay a 1.062% origination fee.201  
 
DEFICIT: 2019 TO 2028, at 34–35 (2018), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-06/54667-budgetoptions-
2.pdf (proposing a limit on forgiveness for borrowers or, alternatively, the elimination of PSLF entirely). 
However, a continuously inflating cost may make PSLF a target for budget cuts. See, e.g., id. 
 193. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015 APPENDIX 363–64 (2014), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-
2015-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2015-APP.pdf; see also Robert Farrington, What Does the PAYE Expansion 
Proposal Really Mean?, FORBES (July 17, 2015, 8:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/ 
2015/07/17/what-does-the-paye-expansion-proposal-really-mean/#57e7571e3733. 
 194. JASON DELISLE, ECON. STUD. AT BROOKINGS, THE COMING PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS 
BONANZA 3 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/es_20160922_delisle_evidence_ 
speaks.pdf. 
 195. See Andrew Josuweit, Op-Ed: Trump’s Plan to Cut This Student Loan Program Is a Big Mistake, 
YAHOO FIN. (May 25, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/op-ed-trump-apos-plan-145206637.html. 
 196. This is not to say that undergraduate students do not have significant debt. However, undergraduate 
students graduate with an average debt of $29,000—well within the Obama Administration’s proposed cap. 
See COLL. BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2019, at 4 (2019), https://research.collegeboard.org/pdf/trends-
student-aid-2019-full-report.pdf. 
 197. Wesley Whistle, Is Your Law School Worth It?, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2019, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesleywhistle/2019/11/21/is-your-law-school-worth-it/#63c05f038c7a. 
 198. Findings from the NALP/PSJD 2018 Public Service Attorney Salary Survey, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. 
PLACEMENT (June 2018), https://www.nalp.org/0618research. 
 199. Income-Driven Repayment Plans, supra note 145. 
 200. Federal Interest Rates and Fees, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.gov/understand-
aid/types/loans/interest-rates#rates (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 201. Ryan Lane, How Student Loan Fees Work and What They Cost, NERDWALLET (Oct. 13, 2020), 
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-loans/student-loan-fees/. 
990 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:959 
To qualify for relief, the aspiring public defender would make 120 
monthly payments, each capped at 10% of income—totaling $58,300, and also 
pay an origination fee of $944.46. Under PSLF, the remaining balance and 
interest is completely forgiven. However, if the proposed cap was in effect, our 
borrower would have $116,744.46 covered202—but would still owe at least 
$53,000 in interest.203 This example also excludes the consideration of any 
undergraduate student debt, which would continue to accrue interest if not 
fully paid. Simply put, a cap on forgiveness would have greatly diminished 
PSLF’s debt-reducing appeal to graduate students and deterred them from 
pursuing the program.204  
C. ELIMINATING PSLF HARMS BORROWERS AND PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYERS 
On the other hand, the Obama Administration’s proposed cap of $57,500 
is better than $0, which was the PSLF relief amount recommended by 
President Trump.205 In all of its proposed budgets, the Trump Administration 
recommended eliminating PSLF.206 Doing so would create large207 fiscal 
savings: the Congressional Budget Office projected that removing the program 
would save between $4.7 and $5.8 billion through 2023, and between $18.0 
and $22.4 billion through 2028.208 Justifying a program that incurs these costs 
requires addressing a simple question: why is PSLF important?  
To borrowers, PSLF is a critical program that mitigates the financial risks 
associated with entering public service. As the cost of a higher education in the 
United States rises,209 so does the number of students who borrow loans.210 In 
2018, 43% of Americans incurred some form of debt for their education.211 
 
 202. Adding together the $58,300 paid over ten years of on-time payments, the $57,500 forgiven under a 
capped PSLF, and the $944.46 origination fee. 
 203. A simple loan calculator shows that a loan of $110,000 set to a twenty-five-year loan term with an 
interest rate of 6.08% would generate, in ten years, roughly $60,315 in interest. Under a capped system, our 
hypothetical public defender would have paid over $116,000 on a $110,000 loan, but still have over $53,500 in 
interest remaining. 
 204. Hilary Wething, Don’t Pull the Rug Out from Under PSLF Recipients, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING 
ECON. BLOG (May 23, 2014, 12:41 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/dont-pull-rug-pslf-recipients/. 
 205. See discussion supra note 18. 
 206. See discussion supra note 18. 
 207. It is worth noting that “large” is a relative term, and perhaps PSLF’s savings are not so large when 
placed against the scale of the budget for the entirety of the federal government, or even different programs. 
 208. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 192, at 34. 
 209. Abigail Johnson Hess, The Cost of College Increased by More Than 25% in the Last 10 Years—
Here’s Why, CNBC: MAKE IT (Dec. 13, 2019, 10:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/13/cost-of-college-
increased-by-more-than-25percent-in-the-last-10-years.html. 
 210. Abigail Johnson Hess, Student Debt Increased by 107% This Decade, Federal Reserve Data Shows, 
CNBC: MAKE IT (Dec. 30, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/30/student-debt-totals-increased-
by-107percent-this-decade.html. 
 211. FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 43 (2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-
201905.pdf. 
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Student borrowers collectively owe over $1.6 trillion in student loan debt.212 
Yet the salaries offered by public service opportunities may not assuage 
student debt fears. In his closing remarks on the CCRAA, Senator Kennedy 
referenced three public service fields—education, criminal justice, and 
developmental needs—which offer relatively low salaries.213 By guaranteeing 
forgiveness in exchange for service, PSLF makes public sector opportunities 
financially feasible for borrowers to undertake.  
This stability is especially enticing to graduate and professional students, 
who likely have accumulated additional debt from their studies. While 
professionals may genuinely wish to serve the public sector, many take higher-
paying private sector positions to manage student debt. PSLF helps bridge debt 
concerns and encourages students to assume public service careers. For 
example, a 2019 survey of graduating medical students found that of the 43% 
of graduates who planned to pursue a loan forgiveness program, 75% indicated 
that PSLF was their program of choice.214 The same survey also shows that 
interest in PSLF among medical school graduates has risen every year since 
2015—demonstrating the program’s appeal in professional circles. 
PSLF is also a critical recruitment and retention tool for public sector 
employers. As society advances, many positions require advanced degrees to 
fill specialized roles.215 PSLF mitigates the significant debt incurred in earning 
these degrees, allowing public sector employers to compete against their 
private sector counterparts in talent recruitment. In responding to a 
Congressional inquiry on how PSLF’s elimination would affect the U.S. Navy, 
the Department of Defense wrote: “[e]liminating or restricting the PSLF 
Program would have a significant impact on recruiting and retention . . . at a 
time when the services are vying with an expanding and robust private sector 
to recruit and retain our most capable people.”216  
In sum, PSLF is worth saving because it plays two critical roles: it helps 
public sector employers attract talent and provides graduates with an attractive 
means of managing student debt. Furthermore, the program’s problems deserve 
immediate reform to ensure its benefits are accessible to all federal borrowers. 
The next Part provides a blueprint of actions to accomplish robust reform.  
 
 212. Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt Statistics in 2020: A Record $1.6 Trillion, FORBES (Feb. 3, 2020, 
6:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2020/02/03/student-loan-debt-statistics/#108d8414281f. 
 213. 153 CONG. REC. S11,242 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“If . . . you want 
to become a schoolteacher, you want to work in the criminal justice system, you want to work with special 
needs children, you want to work for a nonprofit, you will never pay more than 15 percent of your income in 
repayment of your debt.”). 
 214. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., MEDICAL SCHOOL GRADUATION QUESTIONNAIRE: 2019 ALL SCHOOLS 
SUMMARY REPORT 43–44 (2019), https://www.aamc.org/system/files/2019-08/2019-gq-all-schools-summary-
report.pdf. 
 215. Laura Pappano, The Master’s as the New Bachelor’s, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/education/edlife/edl-24masters-t.html?_r=1&ref=edlife. 
 216. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INFORMATION PAPER ON PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS IMPACT 2 (2017), 
https://edlabor.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-11-14%20RFI%20Public%20Service%20Loan%20 
Forgiveness%20Impact3.pdf. 
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IV.  CONCEPTUALIZING COMPREHENSIVE REFORM 
Congress and the Department of Education must develop a multi-pronged 
approach to address PSLF’s numerous problems. Once these comprehensive 
reforms are implemented, PSLF will gradually improve, which will increase 
program use and create a powerful impetus for further reform. 
A. THE FIRST STEP: FIXING A FAILED FRAMEWORK 
Before addressing other issues, Congress and the USED must first 
broaden access to PSLF and ensure that participating public servants have a 
strong likelihood of receiving forgiveness. To do this, both entities must 
address the problems that underlie PSLF’s rejections: limitations on which 
loans qualify for forgiveness, shifting definitions of public service, and 
servicer misconduct.  
1. Legislating Accessibility 
Congress should amend PSLF to allow all types of federal loans and 
repayment plans to qualify for forgiveness. As detailed earlier, PSLF’s 
statutory text restricts forgiveness loans of a specific type of federal loan (a 
Direct Loan) and repayment plan (income-driven repayment). These 
specifications prevent at least a third of current student borrowers from 
qualifying for relief.217 Importantly, there are also no obvious218 policy reasons 
beyond cost to continue limiting forgiveness to just income-driven Direct 
Loans packages. 
This change has three major benefits. First, it ensures that borrowers who 
have both committed themselves to public service and made ten years of loan 
payments are not denied forgiveness for simply holding an ineligible federal 
loan. It would remedy potential issues for many current borrowers. In 2020, 
12.7 million borrowers held federal loans that were not Direct Loans,219 while 
over 2 million borrowers had a disqualifying repayment plan.220 Broadening 
PSLF’s requirements would ensure that these borrowers can access 
forgiveness.  
Second, this change would reduce both the need and negative effects of 
reconsolidation. As discussed earlier, reconsolidation is a reset button that 
allows a borrower to begin qualifying for forgiveness, but disregards past 
payments made in good faith toward the program’s requirements.221 A 
 
 217. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 218. One hypothetical explanation for requiring income-driven payments is that Congress wanted to 
ensure that a student was making significant payments on her Direct Loan (and paying a lower amount via a 
graduated repayment plan was insufficient). However, the existence of the TEPSLF program, which offers 
forgiveness for meeting all of the PSLF’s requirements sans income-driven repayments, suggests that specific 
requirement is not essential to program operations. 
 219. See “FY 2020” row supra Table 3. 
 220. See “FY 2020” row supra Table 4. 
 221. See discussion supra note 125. 
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borrower’s need to reconsolidate222 into a PSLF-qualifying package is 
completely eliminated by allowing payments on all federal loans and 
repayment plans to count toward forgiveness.  
Finally, broadening PSLF’s requirements to include all federal loans 
would limit servicer misconduct. As detailed in Part II.A.2, loan servicers 
practically serve as program gatekeepers, and have steered borrowers away 
from PSLF-qualifying packages. The proposal detailed above reduces a 
borrower’s need to reconsolidate loans to qualify for forgiveness, and thus 
deprives servicers of opportunities to provide erroneous program information.  
2. Promulgating Protections 
While Congress expands PSLF’s accessibility via legislative reform, the 
USED should issue rules to protect borrowers from servicer misconduct. If 
effectively designed and implemented, these rules would clarify the ambiguous 
public service requirement, enact strong oversight measures for servicers, and 
protect current applicants from political interference.  
First, the USED should implement a new rule to clarify (1) what qualifies 
as public service, and (2) how to classify a payment toward forgiveness as on-
time. The program’s current regulations of these criteria hamper borrowers: 
there is an ever-changing definition of what qualifies as public service,223 
while recertification delays slow a borrower’s path toward forgiveness.224  
The USED should clarify that public service includes employment for (1) 
governmental entities, (2) 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, and (3) any 
Standard Occupational Classification225 codes (SOCs) that the USED finds 
worthy of qualifying for forgiveness. The SOC system is a federal statistical 
standard that classifies workers within different occupational categories.226 
SOCs are superior to PSLF’s current classifications for categorizing 
employment because they sort positions using occupational duties, not the 
goals of employers.227 In addition, SOC codes are readily available and apply 
to nearly every employment position in the United States, providing borrowers 
with clarity on whether their job qualifies for forgiveness.228  
 
 222. If all federal loans and repayment plans qualified for forgiveness, a borrower would only need to 
reconsolidate if she was frustrated with paying multiple loans and wished to centralize all her student loan debt 
into one payment plan. 
 223. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 224. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 225. For the most recent SOCs, see OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STANDARD 
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL (2018), https://www.bls.gov/soc/2018/soc_2018_manual.pdf. As an 
example, Congress could allow all individuals working in the 25-1000 Classification, which includes 
educational instruction and library occupations, to qualify for forgiveness. See id. at 78–91. 
 226. Standard Occupational Classification, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/soc/ (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
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The USED should also redefine the meaning of an “on-time” payment to 
allow borrowers to make up payments missed due to forbearance.229 Current 
regulations exclude the use of lump-sum payments in calculating whether 120 
qualifying payments are made.230 Redefining “on-time” to specifically allow 
lump-sum payments to make up forbearance-induced late payments would 
ensure borrowers are not penalized for delays that are no fault of their own.  
Second, the USED should promulgate regulations to curb the influence of 
servicers within the student loan market. Addressing this issue requires a three-
pronged solution: (1) greater oversight to ensure servicer compliance, (2) 
additional servicers to service the PSLF program, and (3) new rights to afford 
borrowers recourse if they encounter servicer abuse. The USED should codify 
rules facilitating authority for federal and state agencies to coordinate and 
review servicer actions and bring litigation as necessary. At minimum, 
promulgating oversight requirements would create clear violations of federal 
law for any USED official who seeks to obstruct investigations.  
Instead of having FedLoan service all PSLF loans,231 the USED should 
also allow multiple federal loan servicers to service the program. This change 
would diminish the monopoly that FedLoan currently holds in administering 
PSLF, while also partially resolving the principal-agent dilemma that non-
FedLoan servicers confront when presented with a borrower who is 
considering forgiveness.  
The USED should supplement increased oversight and additional PSLF 
servicers with a new borrower right: the ability to change a federal loan 
servicer at will. Currently, once a borrower is assigned a servicer, she may 
only switch servicers in limited circumstances.232 Unless a borrower 
meticulously executes a switch, she is tied to her servicer for the entirety of the 
loan’s duration.233 This change would introduce competitiveness into the 
 
 229. Congress also holds the authority to legislate exceptions to allow periods of forbearance to count 
towards forgiveness. One recent example of this comes in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act passed by Congress to provide relief during the COVID-19 crisis. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). Congress specifically included that during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, qualifying borrowers who were placed in forbearance would receive credit toward 
forgiveness as if they made on-time monthly payments. Id. § 3513. 
 230. See discussion supra note 150. 
 231. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 232. Michael Lux, Guide to Switching Federal Student Loan Servicers, STUDENT LOAN SHERPA BLOG 
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://studentloansherpa.com/guide-switching-federal-student-loan-servicers/. Note that 
while attempting PSLF certification is a suggested tactic, FedLoan is the only servicer that certifies PSLF—
hardly a choice. See id. 
 233. There are few incentives for a servicer to provide customer-friendly service. At best, borrower 
satisfaction is factored into an algorithm that the USED uses to allocate new borrowers to different servicers. 
FED. STUDENT AID, EXPLANATION OF ALLOCATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASURE METHODOLOGY 3, 
https://studentaid.gov/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/servicer/06302017/ExplanationQuarterEnd063017.p
df (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (step 8, metric 4). However, borrower satisfaction only counts for 35% of the 
algorithm. Id. 
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student loan market and incentivize servicers to provide optimal customer 
service to avoid losing borrowers. 234 
To be sure, allowing borrowers to switch servicers is not a silver bullet. 
There are foreseeable concerns, including logistical issues and fierce 
opposition from loan servicers. Regulations would need to be carefully 
designed to avoid forcing servicers out of the entire industry.235 Government 
antitrust attorneys would need to remain vigilant to discourage servicers from 
colluding and offering lackluster services to the entire industry.236 Despite 
these challenges, allowing borrowers to change servicers would promote the 
interests of borrowers in a method that, unlike increased oversight, is less 
prone to political interference. 
B. BUILDING BLUEPRINTS FOR A BORROWER-FRIENDLY BUREAUCRACY 
An enhanced regulatory regime, combined with broadened accessibility 
to the program, may provide a combined impetus for further innovative 
improvements to PSLF. If these suggested changes are implemented, then the 
USED will have a flourishing program that demands greater refinement and 
adaptation to serve an expanding number of public servants.  
1. Innovating Away Information Gaps 
Greater PSLF usage would incentivize the USED to invest in vital 
technology that streamlines information and reduces complexity for both 
borrowers and reviewers. Right now, to track their progress toward 
forgiveness, a borrower must interact with her servicer—a process fraught with 
rabbit holes.237 After a borrower submits an application for forgiveness, the 
USED, FedLoan, and the borrower’s initial servicer (if applicable) engage in a 
lengthy and tedious review process.238 The sheer volume and stress of 
 
 234. It is worth noting that the Trump Administration has promoted the opposite: in 2017, the USED 
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Trump to Offer Exclusive Contract to Service U.S. Student Loans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 19, 2017, 
2:57 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-05-19/us-to-give-contract-for-student-loan-
servicing-to-one-company. While that bidding was eventually scrapped, the USED has not counted out 
revisiting it later. Lauren Camera, DeVos Backs Away from Single Student Loan Servicer, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Aug. 2, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2017-08-
02/betsy-devos-backs-away-from-single-student-loan-servicer. 
 235. For an overview of existing governmental regulations on loan servicers, see KEVIN M. LEWIS & 
NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45917, FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF STUDENT LOAN 
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 236. See, e.g., Letter from Elizabeth Warren, Cory Booker, and David Cicilline, Sens. and Member of 
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2019.06.25%20Letter%20to%20FTC%20re%20Nelnet-Great%20Lakes%20merger1.pdf. 
 237. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 238. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-547, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS: EDUCATION 
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additional review could incentivize the development of an innovative 
alternative: a web-based platform that allows borrowers to manage their loans, 
submit payments, and evaluate qualifications.  
Similar systems already exist in other industries. For example, 
homeowners can make mortgage payments through bank-sponsored websites, 
while some vehicle insurance companies allow drivers to modify their plans 
online. The concept is not foreign to the USED, either: in 2016, the Obama 
Administration announced an initiative to create a web-based student loan 
management platform.239 However, after initially indicating support for the 
proposal,240 then-Secretary DeVos cancelled the initiative in 2018.241 A 
burgeoning PSLF could force the USED’s hand to invest in a platform that 
gives borrowers greater control over their loans.  
Creating an online platform would also ease PSLF’s administrative 
burdens. The program is riddled with complex requirements and qualifications 
that a borrower must fulfill to receive forgiveness. An accessible platform that 
provides upfront information and loan management tools would allow a 
borrower to better track her path toward forgiveness. Moreover, it would 
simplify the complex vetting process a relief application goes through. Instead 
of contacting multiple servicers to piece together a borrower’s qualifications, 
the USED’s platform would simply track compliance throughout the loan’s 
term.  
2. Streamlining a Path to Applicant Success 
Increased program participation could also create a catalyst for a 
complete restructuring of PSLF’s administration. Currently, forgiveness is 
retroactively granted: a borrower may apply for forgiveness only after meeting 
the program’s public service and qualifying payment requirements. However, 
the education loan process begins when a student enters higher education242—
forcing most students to select their loans before even declaring a major, let 
alone deciding career opportunities. These decisions, if left uncorrected, could 
disqualify a borrower’s participation in PSLF from the start.  
This dilemma is best illustrated via an analogy. Suppose a client asked 
two chefs to make a pizza and supposed also that the client has very particular 
tastes. One chef is given the entire recipe, while the other receives no 
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specifications. While the former will collect the correct ingredients and 
produce a pizza to the client’s liking, the latter will struggle with an 
overwhelming number of possibilities—say, for toppings, or even the crust’s 
flour. The uninformed chef’s predicament is similar to a borrower’s PSLF 
experience. Upon admission, a student is presented with confusing243 loan 
packages, yet is expected to pick PSLF-eligible loans without necessarily 
knowing if she is interested in the program. This hypothetical is also 
complicated by additional obstacles, including nefarious loan servicers and 
shifting interpretations of public service. Just like the unlucky pizza chef, a 
borrower is likely to develop an incorrect product—rendering her, absent 
consolidation, ineligible for forgiveness.  
To remedy this, PSLF should aspire to provide its “recipe for 
forgiveness” to borrowers as early and as often as possible. Higher education 
institutions are perfectly situated to promote the program to students upon 
admission and throughout learning. Moreover, schools generally hold an 
inherent interest in the financial well-being of their graduates.244 Of course, 
this promotion is contingent upon PSLF’s reputation as a well-executed 
forgiveness program, which is best developed through the multi-pronged 
framework described earlier.245  
Most importantly, proactive encouragement of the program could 
catalyze a crucial final reform: restructuring PSLF’s administration into a 
forward-facing operation. Once clear definitions, robust oversight regulations, 
program promotions, and innovative tools are fully developed, Congress and 
the USED should require that borrowers register246 for PSLF before service 
and payments are counted toward the program’s requirements. Requiring 
registration for PSLF has multiple benefits: it provides borrowers with an 
initial check on their program eligibility, projects future forgiveness costs for 
the USED’s budget planning, and helps servicers identify borrowers who are 
headed toward relief.  
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CONCLUSION 
PSLF is the epitome of a poorly designed government program. While its 
creation was certainly well-intended, its rigid statutory and regulatory 
requirements were a misfit for America’s existing student loan infrastructure. 
Manipulative servicer misconduct, inconsistent interpretations of qualifying 
service, and repeated oversight obstruction corroded the program’s ill-suited 
framework—setting up most applicants for eventual rejection. While the 
Obama Administration’s loan market reforms helped borrowers access the 
program’s required components, robust reform is needed to address PSLF’s 
core problems and secure its successful future. 
Correctly identifying the program’s core problem among an ocean of red 
herrings is critical in order to implement effective reforms. This Note advanced 
a comprehensive approach to resolving PSLF’s conundrum: securing borrower 
protections and expanding the program’s breadth to apply to all federal loan 
borrowers. These legislative and regulatory fixes would immediately improve 
PSLF’s administration and ability to grant relief, setting the stage for further 
program reform. By undertaking this critical first step, Congress and the USED 
can generate a powerful impetus for further program advancement.  
Delivering on PSLF’s promise—providing loan forgiveness for 
Americans who work in public service—is not just a progressive, borrower-
friendly ideal. Rather, it is a nonpartisan necessity as higher education costs 
rise and the gap between private and public sector salaries expands. As 
graduates seek financial stability within their careers, a robust PSLF program 
is imperative to ensuring that public service positions remain filled. Through 
careful problem identification and comprehensive reform, Congress and the 
Department of Education can secure and streamline PSLF’s benefits for 
student borrowers and public service employers to serve communities across 
our nation.  
 
